Emotions in economic action and interaction by Nina Bandelj
Emotions in economic action and interaction
Nina Bandelj
Published online: 25 April 2009
# The Author(s) 2009. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract How do emotions influence economic action? Current literature
recognizes the importance of emotions for economy because they either help
individuals perform economic roles through emotion management or enhance-
ment of emotional intelligence, or because they aid rationality through their
influence on preference formation. All these strands of research investigate the
link between emotions and economy from an atomistic/individualistic perspec-
tive. I argue for a different approach, one that adopts a relational perspective,
focuses on emotional embeddedness and examines how emotions matter in
economic interactions. Emotional embeddedness research starts with a premise
that emotions result from and are influenced by interactions between economic
actors during the economic process where emotional currents and their visceral and
physical manifestations come to the fore. This increases the uncertainty in
economic transactions and complicates the given means-ends logic of rational
economic decision making, yielding economic action principles different from
utility maximization. I propose two types of such creative economic action in this
paper: improvisation and situational adaptation. Improvisation characterizes
situations where ends (goals) and means are unclear at the beginning of a
transaction process and get articulated as a consequence of emotional embedded-
ness experienced during a process. Situational adaptation characterizes situations in
which means or ends of action change because of interaction-induced emotions that
prompt actors to choose new means/ends. The article concludes with a call for
empirical research that explicates further the influence of emotions not merely for
rational economic action but also creative economic interactions.
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Since Enlightenment, Western societies have considered emotions and emotion-
ality as the antithesis of reason and rationality (Harding and Pribram 2004). In
particular, economic analysts interested in rational economic behavior have largely
ignored the role of emotions (Elster 1998), or at best treated them as a residual
category, as noise that is captured by the error term in the utility function. And
while economic sociologists have examined a variety of social forces that influence
economic processes, including networks, institutions, politics, and culture, they too
have paid little attention to the role of emotions.
Recently, however, considerations of emotions and emotionality have returned to
the analyses of economic processes. The most prominent among the economists,
Robert Frank (1987, 1998), investigates the strategic role of emotions. Economic
sociologist Viviana Zelizer (2000, 2003, 2005) has forcefully argued against the
commonly assumed separation of emotion-infused intimate relations and economic
rationality into two “hostile worlds.” Paul DiMaggio (2002) has made a call for
“endogenizing animal spirits” in economic analyses. Jocelyn Pixely (1999, 2002a,
2002b, 2004) and Jean-Pierre Hassoun (2005) have written on emotions and finance.
In one of the rare reviews on the topic, Mabel Berezin (2005) in her chapter on
“Emotions and the Economy” for the Handbook of Economic Sociology, made a call
for more research by economic sociologists into the link between emotions and
economic action.
The purpose of this article is to respond to this call and to outline the ways
emotions influence economic action, by surveying the existing research and
proposing a novel direction of inquiry. I argue that most current literature that
recognizes the importance of emotions for the economy adopts an atomistic
perspective because it focuses on how emotions shape an individual’s economic
preferences or behaviors. What remains largely unexamined is the role of
emotions in economic interactions between actors. Indeed, in the field of
economic sociology atomistic approaches have been heavily criticized ever since
Mark Granovetter (1985) famously argued that economic action is crucially
influenced by networks of social relations in which actors are embedded.
Following this line of inquiry, I propose that we pay attention to emotional
embeddedness. That is, I urge researchers investigating the social foundations of
the economy to recognize that emotions influence economic action not only
because they shape an individual’s utility function or economic role performance,
but also that emotions matter because they result from, and are influenced by,
interactions that an individual has with other social actors during economic
processes. Moreover, once we adopt this interactionist stance, we need to
reconsider the extent to which economic action can be judged as rational.
Admittedly, from the individual actor’s viewpoint, emotions can very well be
(and are) considered as a heuristic aiding rational economic behavior. However,
during economic interactions emotional reactions of all the interacting persons,
with their immediate, in situ, visceral and physical manifestations, come to the fore
as the interaction is on-going. Such emotional undercurrents and manifestations
likely complicate the set means-ends rational logic of any individual’s economic
decision making and give rise to economic action principles different from utility
maximization. I propose two such creative action types in this article, improvisa-
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tion and situational adaptation, and outline the conditions when they are more or
less likely to occur.1
In the next section, I review the existing approaches on the role of emotions in the
economy, including contributions of the emotion management perspective, emo-
tional intelligence literature, and the work that considers emotions as heuristics for
rational action. The second part of the article focuses on the role of emotions in
economic interaction to present the emotional embeddedness perspective, and
elaborates the consequences this approach has for the understanding of economic
action as rational, means-ends, action.
Emotions and the economy: focus on the individual
Most of the existing work on the intersections between emotions and economy
adopts a viewpoint of an individual and/or focuses on the self in economic
situations. This work includes research on: a) emotion management, b) emotional
intelligence, and c) emotions as heuristics aiding economic rationality. I briefly
review each of these bodies of work in turn.
Emotion management in occupational roles
Following dramaturgical theories, one of the most prominent sociological perspec-
tives that highlight the importance of emotions for economic life is the emotion
management approach developed by Arlie Hochschild. Hochschild argued that
emotions have an irreducible social component; they are governed by social rules
and are managed. That is, people try “to change in degree or quality an emotion or
feeling” (1979: 561), following cultural scripts that define emotion rules. We evoke,
shape, or suppress feelings in line with what we consider appropriate to a particular
situation or a particular social role.
How does emotion management relate to economic action? Hochschild developed
her ideas based on a study of flight attendants and their emotion work, published in a
book entitled The Managed Heart (1983). The author underscored that service
workers are trained to express particular emotional reactions as part of their job, so
that managing emotions becomes work. For instance, she noted that flight attendant
trainees were constantly reminded that their own job security and the company’s
profit rode on a smiling face (p. 104). Much other work followed this line of
research, by investigating how occupational roles that people enact require emotion
1 Throughout the article, I follow Max Weber (1978) and treat economic action as social action since in
economic exchanges actors orient behavior to each other and attempt to make sense of each other’s
actions, as in any other social situation. Adopting this view, I do not try to make a claim that emotions are
particularly relevant for economic action but assume that they matter for economic action just as they
matter for other kinds of social actions because “any emotional state pushes humans to behave in a
particular way” (Turner and Stets 2006: 47) . In fact, my aim is to spell out how emotions influence
economic actions, by paying particular attention to the role of emotions in economic interactions.
Certainly, emotions matter in conjunction with other social forces (e.g., power, culture, institutions, or
networks) but I bracket these other influences in this essay.
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work. For instance, Jennifer Pierce (1996) studied women lawyers and focused on
the aggressive “rambo litigator” style that women have to adopt to be considered
serious lawyers. Recently, Bolton and Boyd (2003), using comparable data to those
of Hochschild, found that airline cabin crew attendants are skillful emotion
managers, not only playing out the emotion rules set by their organizations, but
able to juggle and synthesize different types of emotion work, depending on context
and their individual motivations.
Hence, from the emotion management perspective, emotions matter for economic
action because they are part-and-parcel of occupational (economic) role perfor-
mance. The focus is on managing emotional reactions and expressions to feel and
manifest as closely as possible those emotions that one is supposed to have (or not
have) in any particular economic setting. As such, Hochschild’s contribution clearly
underscores that emotions are not separate from but an integral part of any economic
and business situation. While we may indeed observe a lack of overt emotional
expressions in some economic settings, we should understand these occurrences
through Hochschild’s lens of emotion rules. For instance, a wide-spread idea that
accountants are emotionless and “objective” does not exemplify that, naturally,
emotions and the economy are two separate spheres. Rather, it is evidence for the
fact that performing the economic role of an accountant is guided by emotion rules
whereby socially appropriate behavior means suppression of emotional expressions.
In its emphasis on the importance of culture in shaping how individuals
experience and express—perform—emotions, Hochschild follows the work of
Erving Goffman, the pioneer of the dramaturgical perspective. Nevertheless,
Hochschild develops a dramaturgy different from Goffman’s. As she states,
“emotion managers” described by Goffman can be likened to actors who go about
their roles in the English theater tradition, where most energy is directed to the
outward performance of roles (Hochschild 1979). On the other hand, Hochschild’s
emotion management perspective is focused on the inward processes, or “deep
acting,” and can be best compared to the acting theory based on the Stanislavsky
method, which proposes that actors use “memories and feelings in such a way as to
elicit the corresponding expressions” (1979: 558). That is, while Goffman’s
dramaturgy emphasizes the display of emotional expressions suitable to roles and
situations, deep acting dramaturgy underscores that actors, while portraying emotion
on the surface in some situations, in most other instances really try to alter their
genuine emotional states, and feel the emotions they are supposed to feel in a
particular role and a particular situation. As such, deep acting focuses strongly on the
self, and less on the interactions that the self has with others which is more obvious
in Goffman’s (1967) work on interaction order.
Emotional intelligence and job performance
Another body of work that examines emotions in the economic sphere with a focus
on individuals’ behavior is recent research by business scholars and organizational
psychologists on, so called, emotional intelligence. The notion of emotional
intelligence has become very popular in corporate America over the last fifteen
years. As Cherniss (2000: 2) reports, “when the Harvard Business Review published
an article on the topic, it attracted a higher percentage of readers than any other
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article published in that periodical in the last 40 years. When the CEO of Johnson &
Johnson read that article, he was so impressed that he had copies sent out to the 400
top executives in the company worldwide.”
Although others have written on the topic before, Salovey and Mayer (1990) are
credited as the first to define the term emotional intelligence as “a form of social
intelligence that involves the ability to monitor one’s own and others’ feelings and
emotions, to discriminate among them, and to use this information to guide one’s
thinking and action” (p. 187). We can note that the concept of emotional intelligence
is close to the notion of emotion management, and the two perspectives have much
in common. There is little cross-referencing, however, which may be due to the
(overly) psychological focus of the emotional intelligence research, largely ignoring
that it is socially defined emotion rules that guide much of the capacity of
individuals to manage emotions, as sociologists are quick to emphasize.
The notion of emotional intelligence is pertinent to our discussion of emotions
and economy because one of the key questions in this research is how emotional
intelligence relates to organizational performance. Many organizational psycholo-
gists hold that IQ is not a very good predictor of job performance (Hunter and
Hunter 1984, Snarey and Valiant 1985, Sternberg 1995) and EQ—emotional
quotient, capturing social and emotional abilities of individuals, is considered a
better gauge of potential professional success (Boyatzis et al. 1995; Cherniss 2000).
The literature on emotional intelligence (for a review see Bar-On and Parker
2000) clearly shows that the contemporary Western corporate world explicitly
recognizes emotional dimensions as important to successful job performance.
Therefore, in the practical business world emotions and rationality are not as
separate as they are in most of the economic theory (Elster 1998).2 However, the
focus in this business research on emotional intelligence is on an individual and on
how, practically, development of emotional competencies of managers contributes to
organizational efficiency. Consultants to firms and educators in management
programs using this literature encourage managers to learn more about how to hone
their competencies, learn to manage their emotions and understand the emotions of
others in their work environments in order to be more effective as business actors.
Emotions as heuristic for rational economic action
A third strand of research on emotions and economy focuses on how emotions aid
economic decision-making. Jocelyn Pixley (2000) argues that finance organizations
routinely use emotions in formulating expectations. She states that “emotions are
prevalent all the time” and “necessarily play some part in actually fostering ‘rational’
decision-making in finance organizations” (2000: 42) because they enable economic
actors to formulate expectations, and hence make rational decisions.
Indeed, for any particular decision, the number of goals that is logically possible
is virtually unlimited, and the number of possible strategies to reach these goals is
orders of magnitude larger. Moreover, the number of consequences of any one
strategy is enormous, so that unless some drastic pre-selection happens, the number
of things to consider is so vast and the action problem is so complex that no action
2 The exception is the work of economist Robert Frank, which I review below.
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would result. As Matthews and Wells (1994) point out, emotions serve as one of the
chief mechanisms to constrain and direct our attention, and hence frame our
decisions. Emotions define what shall be considered as relevant for any particular
action problem. In addition, during the process of selecting optimal means for
desired goals, emotions help us narrow down the range of plausible alternatives and
help us rank these alternatives. In all these ways, emotions are very important to
rational economic action.
Therefore, it is easy to see that emotions can be incorporated into the rational
action model. Specifically, emotions influence what the goals of economic action
should be (e.g., may be money or happiness), and they influence how we order our
preferences to help achieve our goals (e.g., we can evaluate strategies based on
analytical considerations of costs and benefits, or we pick something over another
thing based on the level of our emotional attachment to it). In brief, even if our goal
is happiness and not profit, we can still go rationally about achieving this goal.3 That
is, the procedural logic that defines something to be rational—the means-ends
schema, is retained. Procedurally, we decide on our goals (ends) and then select the
most optimal means to reach them. Hence, it doesn’t really matter what those means/
ends are substantively. We can very well use emotional strategies to maximize our
desired ends, or are rational in trying to maximize emotionally charged values. In
fact, Max Weber’s (1978) notion of value rationality captures this process, and
research in the sociology of emotions suggests that emotional states and emotional
attachments provide motivations for many different kinds of actions (Turner and
Stets 2006).
In addition, economist Robert Frank has argued that even what may seem as non-
self interested behavior is, in fact, rational. In his book, Passions within Reason: The
Strategic Role of Emotion (1998), Frank focuses on the intersection between
emotion and economy in the so called “commitment problem.” The gist of this
problem is that commitment appears irrational because it is based on emotions such
as love or anger. However, Frank reasons that it is in one’s interest to engage in
commitment often because otherwise one’s position in a reference group would
suffer if one did not make these commitments, which would worsen one’s wellbeing
in a long term. Hence, there is a calculus of rationality even in apparently irrational
behavior, which Frank calls “shrewdly irrational” (Frank 1987). In this case,
emotions seem to facilitate rational action because they permit us to act in ways
compatible with our long term interests.
Focusing on the link between cognition and emotion, neuroscientific and
psychological experimental evidence also points to the role of affect for rationality.
Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio (1994) argues that affect is essential to rational
action. He posits that human thought is made largely from images, i.e., symbolic and
perceptual representations, and that through a life time of learning people link these
images to positive or negative feelings, or what he calls somatic markers. This means
that when a future outcome is considered and an acquired link between the image of
this outcome and affect is positive, this is perceived as a prompt for action. On the
other hand, if contemplating a future outcome triggers negative somatic markers, this
3 Certainly, putting a value on happiness is rather difficult, since happiness is not as easily quantifiable as
money. However, in principle the logic remains unchanged.
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sounds an alarm. Damasio concludes that “the effective deployment [of reasoning
strategies] probably depends, to a considerable extent, on a continued ability to
experience feelings” (1994: xii). Subjects in his studies who due to injuries sustained
to the prefrontal and somatosensory cortices of the brain had a diminished capacity
to experience emotion were severely hindered in their ability to make intelligent
practical decisions.
Following this research, Slovic et al. (2004) argue that affect can serve as a
heuristic for rational decision making: “Using an overall, readily available affective
impression can be easier and more efficient than weighing the pros and cons of
various reasons or retrieving relevant examples from memory, especially when the
required judgment or decision is complex or mental resources are limited” (p. 314).
Hence, to make decision-making easier, people base their judgments of an activity or
an object not only on what they think about it but also on how they feel about it
(Alhakami and Slovic 1994). Using emotions as a heuristic may be also one of the
reasons why people engage in transactions with those they already know. As
exchange theory stipulates, commitment reduces negative emotions like apprehen-
sion and anxiety associated with uncertainty, and hence lowers the emotional costs to
the exchange, thereby increasing overall payoffs (Kollock 1994).
But while heuristics are often used to solve problems more efficiently, they also
lead to significant departures from what synoptic rationality would yield (Kahneman
et al. 1982). Affect can serve as a shortcut, but it can often also mislead, i.e., lead
people to make suboptimal decisions. For instance, studying the relationship
between affect and perceptions of risk, Finuncane et al. (2000) conducted an
experiment and found that in situations of equal benefits, when information stated
that benefit was high, this led to more positive affect, and hence the interpretation
that risks are low. On the contrary, negative affect led to inference about low
benefits. In another study in the area of finance, Ganzach (2000) found that if
unfamiliar stocks were perceived as good based on the global attitude, they were
judged to have high return and low risk, which may have not been actually the
case. Likewise, Hsee and Kunreuther (2000) found that people were willing to
pay twice as much to insure a beloved antique clock (that no longer works and
cannot be repaired) against loss in shipment to a new city than to insure a similar
clock for which one holds no special feelings. It is important to note that in both
cases, the insurance would pay $100 in the event of loss. Hence, for all practical
purposes, paying extra money for the insurance of a beloved clock was an
irrational decision.
Furthermore, some experimental evidence shows that, in spite of the availability
of information needed to make a decision based on analytical reasoning, people
resort to making a decision based on their feelings. Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994)
showed that, when offered a chance to win $1 by drawing a red jelly bean from an
urn full of jellies of many different colors, individuals often elected to draw from a
bowl containing a greater absolute number, but a smaller proportion, of red beans,
(e.g., seven in 100) than from a bowl containing fewer red beans but a better
probability of “red bean selection” (e.g., one in ten). These individuals would say
that even when they knew that the probabilities were against them, they felt they had
a better chance when there were more red beans. Overall, these experiments point to
the downside of affect as a heuristic. Like other heuristics, affect can help us make
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decisions easier, but it can also lead to courses of action that are suboptimal in terms
of efficiency.
Although neuroscientists and psychologists emphasize the link between cognition
and affect, and view affect as a rational decision-making heuristic because of limited
cognitive abilities of individuals, sociologists emphasize that people revert to
emotions also because of uncertainty that derives from sources other than cognition.
These include uncertainty due to the changes in the external environment and the
social nature of economic interactions, which both create conditions of true,
immeasurable, uncertainty conceptualized by Frank Knight (2002). True uncertainty,
often referred to as Knightian uncertainty, characterizes conditions where the
variance of the probability distribution is itself unknown and hence risk cannot be
estimated (Beckert 1996). According to DiMaggio (2002: 80), in the “conditions of
Knightian uncertainty, when economic actors with rational intentions have little basis
for estimating risk,” they revert to what John Maynard Keynes’s (1936) called
“animal spirits,” i.e. “emotional feeling states that shape economic behavior above
and beyond what a purely cognitive, rational model might lead one to expect”
(DiMaggio 2002: 79).
If market actors had superior cognitive capacities and perfect information, were
acting in stable environments, and their decision making were not interdependent,
then there would be no uncertainty, and hence no need to fall back on emotions to
guide economic actions. Actions would be simply based on known and certain
economic conditions. However, none of the above conditions obtains. In particular,
sociologists point out the complexity of decision making because of the social nature
of economic situations. This means, as DiMaggio points out, that “to form rational
expectations, each decisionmaker must take into account the decisions that all others
are likely going to make” (2002: 85). Because actions are interdependent, market
actors are not only uncertain about the future states of the world, but they are also
uncertain about the other market actors’ beliefs about the future states of the world,
that is, the socially constructed expectations about the future. These expectations will
be related to sentiments, feelings of confidence (or doubt) in market activity that will
shape actors’ economic decisions.
The notion that economic decision-makers take into account decisions of others in
formulating their preferences underscores the relational nature of economic
exchanges. But actors do not only take others into account prior to their action
process (to shape their preferences). In fact, most economic transactions are
processes that involve some form of interaction, virtual or face-to-face. This
interactional dimension of transactions generates emotional responses that shape
eventual economic outcomes because they can break-down the given means-ends
procedural logic of rationality. That is, emotions do not only serve as a heuristic for
rational decision making but they also induce economic action types other than the
generally assumed rational action. I turn to this point in the second part of the paper.
Emotional embeddedness: Focus on interactions
The literature reviewed in the first part of this article focuses on how emotions
matter for individual action outside of the interactional context, such as for
354 Theor Soc (2009) 38:347–366
occupational role performance (emotion management research), job performance
(emotional intelligence research) and rational decision making (affect-as-a-heuristic
research). Instead of this individualistic focus, I want to direct our attention to why
and how emotions matter in economic interactions, and explicate this aspect of the
emotional embeddedness of economic processes.
Mark Granovetter famously asserted that “the behavior and institutions [of
economic life] are so constrained by ongoing social relations that to construe them as
independent is a grievous misunderstanding” (1985: 481–482). This statement about
the embeddedness of economic action in social networks became the basis of
expansive research in economic sociology (for a review see Smelser and Swedberg
2005). Analogously, I propose a concept of emotional embeddedness of economic
action, arguing that because economic action is interdependent and because
transactions between parties to an exchange are always relational, emotions
produced in interaction significantly influence economic outcomes. Like culture,
networks, institutions, and power, emotions also enable and constrain economic
activity.
This relational view of the role of emotions in economic processes builds on
interactionist theories of emotions (for review, see Turner and Stets 2006). One of
the key contemporary contributors to this perspective is Randall Collins (1981,
2004) who follows Goffman (1967) and Durkheim (1965[1912]) to focus on
interaction rituals as the micro basis of social structure. Interaction rituals have a
strong emotional component; they generate emotional energy. According to Collins,
individuals always strive to maximize emotional energy in their encounters, and this
is mediated by power and status. Another strand of interactionism builds on the
symbolic interactionism of Mead (1934, 1938) and Cooley (1964 [1902]) and
focuses more on the self and identity as the catalysts of emotional arousal in
interaction situations. From this perspective, which is also informed by the Gestalt
philosophy, positive emotions are generated when one’s view of one’s self is
confirmed by others in interactions (Turner and Stets 2006). Individuals pursue
various strategies to achieve this congruence and consistency.
Although the interaction ritual and the symbolic interactionist approaches differ in
their emphases, they both share a premise that any encounter has underlying, more
or less intense, emotional currents. If we apply this line of thinking to the economic
realm, we can assume that encounters related to production, consumption,
distribution or exchange of goods and services will involve economic actors who
will either build or not positive affect during the process of transacting, and this will
have consequences for economic outcomes.
Consider, for instance, a very typical economic transaction in today’s global
world, foreign direct investment, where actors from two different countries come
together to negotiate a foreign investment effort, such as taking over (a part of) an
established firm in the host country. Here, an economic transaction can be likened to
a social interaction that will lead to a formation of a relationship. Doing just the
opposite of Gary Becker (who interpreted all social actions through the lens of utility
maximizing), let us interpret a supposedly rational economic process through a
social lens. Let us consider closing an investment deal as similar to getting married.
Whether the marriage will happen or not does not only depend on the partners’
objective evaluation of costs and benefits of this transaction. First off, calculating
Theor Soc (2009) 38:347–366 355
transaction costs is pretty difficult. The two potential partners may be able to say
precisely how much each has on their bank accounts, but how do they evaluate their
ability to communicate successfully, or their extent of flexibility in adopting to a new—
joint—living arrangement? Even if they are able to do just fine on their own, can they
extrapolate from this their ability to live together? And even if one of the parties has had
previous marriage experience (i.e., one company has formed partnerships with
companies in other countries), can this experience really be a sound basis for the
assessment of a life with a partner from a different background, different national origin,
with different economic habits?
In case of marriage, at least in the contemporary West, much of this uncertainty
would be overcome during the courtship period, when through a series of
interactions, the two potential partners would form impressions of one another. If
there were no uncertainty, and the two knew ahead of time that their relationship will
work out to the benefit of both involved, there would be no need for a series of
interactions before “closing the deal.” However, this is not the case and is the reason
why formation and affirmation of emotions plays a crucial role. Ultimately, the two
prospective partners build sympathy and continue to like, love, each other, or they
do not and eventually go their separate ways.
Since economic actions are social actions (Weber 1978), we have no reason to
believe that on some level, economic transactions and negotiations of economic
deals with happen differently. In fact, DiMaggio (1993: 126–127) emphasized that
under conditions of uncertainty, economic agents are “thrown back on sympathy as
an assessment criterion…. Sympathy is constructed in part out of categories (like us/
not like us) and in part out of ongoing interactions in which participants form strong
impressions (confidence, distrust).” And ultimately, if sympathy is built so that both
parties understand this economic transaction as “cooperation and collaboration, ”
“partnership” or a “joint-venture,” this may have quite a different effect on closing a
potential foreign investment deal than if this effort is perceived as a “hostile take-
over,” for instance. While we have little empirical evidence on how this works in the
reality of large investment deals, experimental research does confirm that, in cases of
simple negotiations, there is a positive association between positive feelings on the
part of both parties to an exchange and likelihood of cooperation (Forgas 1998;
McGinn and Keros 2002). Based on this we can hypothesize that building of
sympathy is going to be important for economic action. Ceteris paribus, those
economic exchanges where transactors will fail to build at least some basic amount
of sympathy will be less likely to realize.
Sympathy, trust and economic action
According to the quote from DiMaggio above, one way sympathy will matter is
because it will be strongly linked to the formation of trust, considered crucial in
economic processes (Kramer 1999; Podolny and Page 1998). Jens Beckert (2005)
argues that trust in markets has to be understood as an interaction between trust-giver
and trust-taker, and that the trust-taker performs acts of self-presentation in order to
win the trust-giver’s trust. These strategies of self-presentation include a)
commitment (i.e., “producing trustworthiness by erecting cognitive or normative
barriers to withdrawal” [Beckert 2005: 23]), b) congruence to expectations of the
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trust-giver, often by emphasizing similarity between the two, c) signaling
competence (i.e., some ability of the trust-taker that makes her worthy of trust) or
d) signaling integrity or authenticity of the trust taker. While none of these
mechanisms speaks directly about the importance of positive emotions, it is easy to
infer that all of the four self-presentation strategies identified by Beckert entail
emotion (not only impression) management by the trust-taker and, in turn, generate
some emotional responses in the trust-giver. In addition, the mere notions of
commitment, congruence to expectations, competence, and integrity all have positive
connotations and they are ranked high in our contemporary Western value space, so
their manifestations would help build positive affect.
In a different account of trust, following Simmel, Luhmann, and Giddens, a
business scholar Guido Moellering (2001, 2006) emphasizes that trust entails
suspension (2001: 414). Trust “presumes a leap to commitment, a quality of ‘faith’
which is irreducible” (Giddens 1991: 19). Giddens (1990) argues that the ability to
trust is learned in infancy through the ambivalent experience of love from caretakers
on the one hand, and the contemporary absence of caretakers on the other, whereby
infants have to develop the ability to reach a state of trust, which “brackets distance
in time and space and so blocks off existential anxieties” (1990: 97). This is akin to
solving the trust/mistrust problem identified as a successful conclusion of the first
phase of development by Erik Erikson (1950). Based on this social-psychological
explanation, we can infer that suspension necessary for a trust relationship, or the
leap of faith that is beyond calculus, is grounded in basic emotional states like
feeling loved and feeling safe. Following this logic, one could hypothesize that leaps
of faith to form trust in the life beyond infancy are enabled by positive emotional
reactions that are produced and felt in the situation in which trust is to be formed. We
can stipulate that in cases where positive emotions are lacking, the leap of faith does
not happen and a person does not “allow” him/herself to trust. The phrase “I fear to
trust” is telling. In the presence of negative emotions, like fear, the act of suspension,
and consequently trust, is unachievable, even if all the information at hand,
rationally processed, leads one to conclude that one has every reason to trust. If one
does not also have “all the feelings necessary to do so” trust will not realize.
For instance, in my research on foreign investment, I found that positive feelings
were one of the decisive factors in the formation of trusting relationships that led to the
realization of foreign investment attempts. In cases where negative feelings prevailed,
the transactions were less likely completed as planned. In one case, middle management
and workers of an East European firm mobilized against an acquisition attempt by an
American corporation, which objectively looked very attractive for the targeted firm as
it would increase their market share and eliminate the key competitor from the market.
Explaining the situation, one of the informants quipped that the Americans behaved as
if, “[they] are going to eat [us] for breakfast,” suggesting arrogance and a condescending
attitude that offended Slovenians. In addition, the media reported on the American way
of doing business, implying lack of care for workers and merciless downsizing, and
framed the American attempt as “a hostile takeover.” These labels and interpretations
represented obstacles to developing trust between the two transaction partners. In no
small way, negative feelings may have fueled the opposition to the American
investment, which in combination with other negative conditions eventually propelled
Americans to withdraw their offer (Bandelj 2008).
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On the whole, emotions are important in economic interaction because sympathy
helps build trust, which ultimately helps solve the uncertainty problem. (Obviously,
as the example above indicates, the opposite also holds: antipathy leads to mistrust).
Nevertheless, it would be reductionist to consider the importance of emotions simply
because they are related to trust (or to even equate emotions with trust as does Pixley
[1999, 2002b, 2004], for instance). It is plausible that emotions have an independent
role in economic interactions. And while in practice this may be hard to distinguish,
we can do so analytically. In particular, we can point to the distinction between trust
as an attitude (Berezin 2005), without distinct bodily states associated with it, and
emotion as a state with its physical properties. The phrase, “gut feelings” captures
this nicely. Emotions come with butterflies in the stomach, or tensed muscles, or
redness of face, sweaty hands, or cold feet, literally and metaphorically. I elaborate
on the visceral qualities of emotions, and their consequences, in the next section.
Physicality of emotions and economic interactions
The individualistic perspectives reviewed in the first half of the article generally
consider emotions as easily recognizable and manipulable. A flight attendant who
manages emotions to fit the job requirements of an always smiling and cheerful
service worker, or a manager who strives to develop emotional competencies to be
able to guide her subordinates in a more effective way, or a financial expert, who is
confident in the market, and makes stock purchase decisions based on this
assessment, all these actors have to be consciously aware of their emotions to
manipulate them and to use them to various ends. But as Mabel Berezin importantly
points out, “the moment that one is conscious of an emotion and attempts to control
it, emotion becomes a cognition and is no longer strictly speaking an emotion”
(2005: 118).
Indeed, some scholars propose that emotions are first and foremost bodily states.
William James (1884) defined emotions as feelings caused by changes in
physiological conditions relating to the autonomic and motor functions. When we
perceive that we are in danger, for example, this perception sets off a collection of
bodily responses, and our awareness of these responses is what constitutes fear.
Hence, "we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we
tremble, and [it is] not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or
fearful, as the case may be" (James 1884: 190). While other scholars disagree that
emotions are solely or primarily physiological responses, the fact that emotions have
physical manifestations is widely accepted (Berezin 2005).
Jean-Pierre Hassoun (2005: 103–104) captures this physical quality of emotions
as they play out in the economic arena par excellence, a stock market trading floor:
[A]nyone who has directly observed financial market actors knows that
emotions and their verbal and physical expression are a daily part of these
activities.... Financial market actors’ behavior openly expresses such varied
emotions as sympathy, admiration, anger, aggressiveness, feelings of rivalry,
shame, and humiliation…. [Emotions] can be read first of all on faces, where
strong tension and concentration may be perceived, but also at those moments
when facial muscles, and the body with them, suddenly go loose….
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[Emotions] are on daily display in the form of angry verbal outbursts, shoving,
friendly, ambiguous, or aggressive backslapping, complicitous hand taps,
hateful or empathetic looks, yelling, swearing, and insults.
Based on Hochschild’s concept of emotion work, we can interpret such market
behavior as management of emotions appropriate to a particular role of a financial
trader defined by the trading floor culture (see also Abolafia 1996). However, it is
important to note that not all emotional expressions can be controlled, and hence
strategic in helping a trader be as successful as possible in his or her job. In
particular, those emotions that show in non-verbal physical signals, e.g., sweating,
skin redness, diverting gaze, or shaking voice, may be rather subconscious.
The physical component of emotions is interesting precisely because it represents
the non-cognitive part of emotions and thus cannot be easily subsumed into the
rational action framework. Different situations call forth different emotive states that
are not only consciously manufactured but are immediately felt, perceived and
experienced, and thus hard to articulate. These “on the spot” feelings can be related
to what many economic actors refer to as intuition (Agor 1986; Abolafia 1996).
Intuition may be precisely the state that combines immediate cognition and
emotional “gut” reaction in influencing behavior. Especially because they cannot
be completely mastered by cognition and hence controlled, visceral reactions, gut
feelings, and states that are more or less subconsciously experienced may interfere
with rationality.
Indeed, if affect and thought are as intimately intertwined as Damasio (1994,
1999) suggests, then any interpretation of information that one considers relevant for
an economic transaction will conger up some physically experienced feelings, not
only thoughts and attitudes. Hence, interpreting a potential’s partner social
characteristics (position in a network, reputation, social identities) leads to feeling
formation, in addition to cognitive evaluation. Together with other impressions,
these feelings become a part of economic transactions and negotiations, and can
shape their outcome. Moreover, it is unlikely that as the relationship proceeds, i.e.,
during the process of economic interaction with many encounters following one
another, that feelings are going to stay unchanged. In the interaction process, people
constantly pick up clues that produce new emotional states that either affirm existing
ones or are quite different from them. In addition, a person engaged in the interaction
also perceives the emotional states of interaction partners, which in turn influence
one’s own emotions. Hence, these “interaction-generated” physically experienced
emotional states can also induce a person to change his or her preference orderings
or even to change his or her preference set, which would result—during the
economic interaction—in setting new goals and new strategies to reach them, more
in line with the new emotional states. As a consequence, the means-ends logic of
decision making, which by definition of rational action is set before the transaction
occurs, may not be retained throughout the interaction process. Hence, utility
maximization is unlikely to realize.
It is important to note that the influence of emotions in interaction should not be
conceived as random mood swings, or changing one’s mind on a whim. True,
interaction is always somewhat uncertain and ambiguous and can be interpreted in
different ways. Nevertheless, this does not render interaction completely unpredict-
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able and arbitrary. While people receive new information and perceive new emotions
during the interaction itself, they are able to use these as social and emotional clues
that they know how to interpret. Perception and interpretation of these social clues
can be linked to that person’s past experience and to connections stored in memory
(Damasio 1999). People will be positively oriented if the interaction generated clues
are going to affirm their own social identity, align with things they themselves
consider valuable, and produce cultural matching. This will generate positive affect.
On the other hand, when encountering behavior and attitudes dissonant to their
experiences, upbringing, cultural tastes, in short habitus (Bourdieu 1980), people
will tend to dislike those displaying such behavior, perhaps so much as to refrain
from further interaction with them. Because these interaction-induced sensations/
impressions work on the non-cognitive level, we can suspect that people will not be
able to justify well their decisions to refrain from or continue interactions with
particular partners, except to say that they had “a bad feeling” about the exchange or,
alternatively, that they “simply like” their potential partner.
Emotional embeddedness and rationality of economic actions
From the above discussion, we can conclude that the emotional embeddedness of
economic action has important consequences for the common understanding of
economic behavior as rational action. According to neoclassical theories, rational
actors follow a means-ends approach and make decisions deductively by first
determining their goals (ends), then evaluating the potential strategies (means) to
reach goals based on the information at hand and, finally, choosing the alternative
that leads to profit maximization. Researchers now readily acknowledge that
possession of perfect information is impossible and that actors have cognitive
limitations that prevent them from maximization. Rather, as Herbert Simon (1957)
theorized, actors are bounded-rational and they satisfice rather than maximize. Also,
it is recognized now that economic actors may choose to maximize goals other than
profits. Nevertheless, what is characteristically assumed of rational economic action
is its procedural means-ends logic, whereby goals and preferences are set a priori
and are stable over the course of action.
What implications, then, does emotional embeddedness have for such means-ends
rational action? As we reviewed, some clearly argue that emotions enable rational
economic action because they shape the preference formation and help actors
overcome uncertainty. However, emotions may also constrain rationality because a)
heuristics, including affect, often lead actors to decide on courses of action that are
suboptimal with regards to rationality, 2) non-cognitive aspects of emotions that
accompany economic interactions may break down the consistent means-ends
schema. Considering these conditions, it may be more analytically useful to
conceptualize economic action as practical rather than as rational.
Practical action
Practical action refers to activity whereby reasoning is infused with unreflective
routine following, emotional reactions, normative commitments, and creativity.
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Practice is not wholly consciously organized (Bourdieu 1980). It is not random or
purely accidental but, as one thing follows from another, practical action happens.
Bourdieu uses the metaphor of social life as a game to exemplify the relationship
between the determined and the improvisational aspects of practice. First, all games
have rules and they determine what players can and cannot do. Second, games are
learned through explicit teaching as well as experientially, in practice. Accordingly,
when they are engaged in social practices, most people depend on their social
competence, their own experience, or their practical sense of logic rather than an
analytical model.
The theory of practical action is grounded in ethnomethodology, the work of
Harold Garfinkel in particular, and emphasizes the role of routines, conventions, and
“practical reason” in guiding action. As Garfinkel observed, actors in everyday life
are practical and largely follow routines. Hence, if the sphere of economic life and
business is just another realm of social life, preeminence of the rational action model
to capture economic processes may be unwarranted. In addition, practical action is
characterized by the fact that the affective and evaluative dimensions of action are
intimately bound up with cognition (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 22).
The practical action model also builds on the philosophy of pragmatism and a
view that action is not just contingent on the situation but that the “situation is
constitutive of action” (Joas 1996: 160, emphasis added):
In order to be able to act, the actor must pass judgment on the nature of the
situation. Every habit of action and every rule of action contain assumptions
about the type of situations in which it is appropriate to proceed according to
the particular habit or rule. In general, our perception of situations already
incorporates a judgment on the appropriateness of certain kinds of action. This
explains why situations are not merely a neutral field of activity for intentions,
which were conceived outside of that situation, but appear to call forth, to
provoke certain actions already in our perception (Joas 1996: 160).
Action, then, is not merely teleological, i.e., geared toward specific identified
ends, teloi, but is creative. Activity itself is a source of ends. Goals and preferences
do not simply derive from the “inside” of actors but also depend on situations in
which these actors find themselves and creative solutions they identify in response to
novel circumstances (Whitford 2002: 340). Joas’s notion of creative rather than
teleological action uncovers the potential ambiguity in the relationship between
means and ends. Rational action presupposes that the relationship between means
and ends is clearly defined in a means-ends schema: i.e., that goals (ends) are known
ex ante, and that on the basis of these ends, the most optimal strategy (or means) is
identified, which will allow an actor to accomplish his or her goals best. However, in
actual situations, especially in conditions of high uncertainty and emotional
embeddedness, people often cannot know in advance what the consequences of
their actions will be, so an optimizing strategy cannot be identified. Moreover, if
situations themselves are constitutive of action, then it is possible that the goals and
strategies of action (i.e., both ends and means) are modified during the process of
action itself. In certain cases, both ends and means emerge out of the situation and
are not given prior to it, as assumed by rational action. This suggests that business
actors engage not merely in procedural rationality, i.e., means-end calculations, but
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in other types of action, whereby ends and means are not clearly identified prior to
the action process nor they necessarily remain stable during this process. I identify
two types of such creative action below: situational adaptation and improvisation.
Situational adaptation and improvisation
Based on the above discussion, I propose that economic behavior exemplifies
multiple action principles. Certainly, one of these principles is rational instrumental
action, which is characterized by a clear means-ends logic: ends are defined ex ante,
means are known and selected by optimization, that is, by weighing which means
will best help the actor achieve the desired ends for the least amount of effort or cost.
However, when the means-ends logic breaks down because of uncertainty and
consequent social and emotional embeddedness of economic processes, other types
of action are common. First of all, there are circumstances where ends and means
change during the process of action itself. John starts with a particular goal in mind
and with a selected strategy that seems optimal. However, because of the open-
ended, contingent character of economic interactions, which conjures up emotions in
interaction, unexpected a priori, John feels compelled to change these goals or
reshuffle the strategies as the process of action evolves. We can call this type of
action situational adaptation due to contingency.
The second case of economic action where a rational means-ends logic does not exist,
is the case of severe uncertainty where ends are unclear, and a stable ordering of means/
preferences is absent as well. In this case, the action is best characterized by
improvisation, where action and cognition occur simultaneously. That is, composition
and execution converge in time (Moorman and Miner 1998). By immersion into the
action process itself, John discovers ends and means as he goes along, “on the fly,” as
emotionally charged situations themselves bring forth the acts (Joas 1996). The guiding
principle for such creative action is a feeling for the situation rather than the full
comprehension and command of a situation (Bourdieu 1980). In some cases,
improvisation results in innovation, also a type of creative action, in which the goals
are not in sight nor are the means, and it is the innovation process itself that helps an
actor articulate them (Beckert 2003). This may be particularly the case for
entrepreneurs, who often say that they listened to their heart, or followed intuition, or
trusted their gut feelings, when they pursued an idea. As we know, sometimes these
ideas work out and sometimes (most of the times?) they don’t. Studying this variation
can be a fruitful research site for investigating emotional embeddedness.
If multiple economic action principles exist, sociologists are well equipped to study
when, i.e., under what conditions, some action principles are more likely to occur that
others. An adequate treatment of this question would require more empirical research but
we can stipulate that whether economic actors are more or less engaged in means-ends
calculations to satisfy their goals (i.e., instrumental rationality) will depend on:4
a) goals of action: how clearly they are defined a priori and how stable they are
during the process of decision making,
4 In this discussion we should keep in mind that synoptic rationality is impossible and even if actors
engage in consistent and internally coherent means-ends calculation, they have limited cognitive abilities
and can be only bounded rational (Simon 1957; Kahneman 1994).
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b) means to reach goals: how uncertain they are a priori and how stable they are
during the process of decision making,
c) participation of actors involved: how unitary they are, how many parties are
involved, how clear it is who can make decisions, and what the decision makers’
preferred ways are of handling situations,
d) time constraints: how quickly decisions need to be made, what is their perceived
urgency, and how much time can decision makers devote to them,5 and
e) additional uncertainty: how turbulent and unpredictable environments are that
contribute to uncertainty beyond that generated by the factors mentioned above.
Conclusion
Although scholars have paid some attention to emotions in the economy, I
argued here that their treatment has been incomplete because they almost
exclusively focused on the individuals’ preferences and behaviors, as elaborated
in the work on emotion management, emotional intelligence, and emotions as a
heuristic. In contrast to these individualistic approaches, I focused on the
relational and interactional nature of economic processes and offered an initial
elaboration of the emotional embeddedness concept. I argued that emotions—in
their cognitive but also non-cognitive, physical form—structure economic
action; not only do they shape preference formation or performance of
economic roles (as others have shown), emotions also influence economic
processes because they are generated during the interaction process and cannot
be completely anticipated nor controlled. This is because of emotions’ visceral
qualities but also due to a need to interpret, understand, and evaluate partners
during the interaction; the process in which economic actors build sympathy or
antipathy. Interaction-induced emotions influence the stability of preferences as
the interaction process is ongoing and therefore render action principles other
than means-ends rationality. As a consequence, economic activities may often
resemble more closely creative action, i.e., situational adaptation and improvi-
sation, rather than rational (means-ends) decision-making. Improvisation char-
acterizes situations where ends (goals) and means are unclear at the beginning
of a transaction process and get articulated as a consequence of emotional
embeddedness experienced during a process. Situational adaptation characterizes
situations in which means or ends of action change because of interaction-
induced emotions that prompt actors to choose new means or ends.
That economic action is often creative is scarcely recognized. Unjustly so. After
all, economic action is social action, and we have good reasons—and feelings—to
believe that all those factors that matter for other social relationships, including
emotional embeddedness, will matter also for economic transactions. The challenge
for future research is to find empirical sites to test and to provide further explication
of the role of emotions in creative economic interactions.
5 As Moorman and Miner (1998) find, improvisation is the degree to which composition and execution
converge in time. This implies that with little time, when decisions are made quickly or even on the spot,
improvisation as the principle of action is more common.
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